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The right to use and/or control over land is central to the lives of rural populations 
where the main sources of livelihoods are derived from land. Access to land may not 
be easily understood outside of institutional settings as they are influential factors and 
land is also a natural asset in which its access is filtered through institutions. This 
article, therefore, explores the role of customary and statutory institutions and their 
contributions to ensure access of rural youth to farmland in the context of Gedeo and 
Sidama. Qualitative and quantitative data were triangulated by taking both youth and 
key informants as the main sources of information. The findings of the study show a 
somewhat ‘pessimistic’ picture to shed light on the hitherto neglected role of informal 
institutions to support the formal ones in land and related matters. Customary and 
regulatory institutions were observed ‘conflicting’ as they deal with the already 
scarce land, both of them have their own conditions, as the former is negotiated and 
the latter commanded through the rules of the game. It is the contention of this paper 
that both customary and statuary institutions should work in harmony and show a 
certain level of flexibility to reap the benefits of formal laws and the advantage of 
informal institutions that are already embedded in the society. Thus, identifying some 
sort of common interest in between seems essential to avert role confusion between 
customary and statutory institutions to own, manage and use land as well as to look 
for non-farm options for the youth as land is getting scarce.    
  














Ownership or access to land is a key to the well-being and livelihood of many 
African families. Land is the single most important asset. It is a key social and 
economic asset, crucial for cultural identity, political power and participation in 
decision making, providing a secure place to live and a site for economic and 
social activity (Nzioki, 2007). 
The right to use and/or control over livelihood assets, mainly land, is central 
to the lives of rural population where the main sources of income and livelihood 
are derived from land. The main challenging question to answer adequately is how 
to access farmland as it is a politically, socially and economically sensitive issue. 
Access to land may not be easily understood outside of institutional contexts as 
they are influential factors, and land is also a natural asset filtered through policies 
and institutions.  
The government of Ethiopia currently encourages formal institutions to 
promote its development policy and distributions of resources. The community, on 
the other hand, has been exercising customary institutions before and after the 
introduction of the formal laws. In the traditional institutions, there are different 
social groups which are organized by the local community to solve their problems 
and maintain relationships among community members. People living in the same 
area usually submit themselves voluntarily to these groups and cooperate on 
specific areas of interest as long as they reach a consensus. These traditional forms 
of institutions were not given due attention in establishing access to land and 
streamlining development policies and programs. Accordingly, the government-
initiated formal institutions have been serving the community by dominating the 
traditional ones, but in reality many of the societal problems were tackled more by 
informal institutional settings. Customary and regulatory institutions were seen in 
conflict as they deal with the already scarce resource (i.e. land), both of them have 
their own conditions, as the former is negotiated and the latter commanded. 
However, currently, there is a need to see all options on how the traditional and 
local institutions can work complimentarily and in conformity with the formal 
institutions to implement development activities at each level and maintain equity, 
fair resource distribution including land (Pretty, et al, 1995). 
Land is a critical livelihood resource in rural Ethiopia as it has great social, 
cultural and economic values. Land allocation is blamed for its tendency to favor 
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older adults than younger household heads, especially in the rural areas like 
Wenago of Gedeo and Dara of Sidama where land is very scarce. Many young 
households, because of their youth3 and limited farm experience, obtain less land 
or no land, although they need it seriously and opt to make it the last resort as a 
means of livelihood.  
Formally, able bodied children have legitimate right to claim their share of 
land when they form their homesteads. But such claims over the allocated land at 
times cause dispute and social friction between parents and children particularly 
where community land is scarce and/or land allocation is halted unless negotiation 
is made through traditional means (Yigremew 2002). This is because in 
communities of Sidama and Gedeo access to land is mainly governed by old age 
customary laws, which emerged from unwritten social rules derived from shared 
community values and traditions. The customary laws limit the youth’s rights to 
access land. This is mainly because they happen to be in a subordinate position in 
patriarchal households. These laws underpin patriarchal system of traditional 
authority to reinforce patriarchal values which disadvantage the youth, the 
majority in number and proportion, and place them to a subordinate position in 
society (Tadesse 2002, Watts 1993). This might be one of the very reasons that 
necessitated the operation of formal and informal institutions in harmony to work 
towards favoring all but benefiting the youth by diversifying options of access to 
farmland. 
Formal institutions should be in place at least to oversee these age-old 
customary practices in the community. This is because there are disputes arising 
due to deficiency in customary practices of intergenerational land allocation. It is 
customary in the predominantly patriarchal Ethiopian societies for parents to 
allocate plots of land to their children when they get married. Children, 
particularly male children, are also entitled to inheritance upon the death of their 
fathers. As land becomes scarce, disputes arise over legitimizing claimants to 
parental land, and allocating land equitably to competing children. For protecting 




3  The Ethiopian youth policy (issued in 2004) defines youth as persons of age group 
ranging from 15-29. This age in most rural parts of Ethiopia is a time that rural youth 
aspire and acquire independence by all available options.. 
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Where there are primary and secondary right holders (for example, grazing in crop 
fields after harvest), such rights need to be clarified in statutory or customary 
laws. Failure to meet these conditions as land becomes scarce begets disputes and 
conflicts. For example, since farm boundaries are not always unambiguously 
defined, there are disputes over land use. Similarly, ambiguity over using land 
between primary and secondary holders of land rights is also a source of conflict 
(e.g., grazing crop fields after harvest or excluding non-community members to 
common grazing land in dry season). So far, the role of formal institutions and 
informal institutions in connection to accessing (owning) and managing land is 
investigated in Ethiopia by many researchers: Dessalegn (1995), Yigremew 
(2002), Yared and Zenebework (2000), Teferi (1995), Ege (2002) and Dejene 
(1999), to mention some. Although most of these researchers focused on the role 
of formal institutions in influencing access to land and dealt with land issues and 
adults in other parts of the country, the fate of the youth or emerging households 
was not given attention and researched. The role of institutions in accessing land 
to the youth, it seems, was not properly explained. Research work that connects 
land issues with the youth is scanty. The writers could not easily locate research 
work done on similar issues in the context of rural Ethiopia, in this case in rural 
Gedeo and Sidama specifically. As a result of this, it appears that there is 
knowledge gap in this regard. Therefore, how these statutory and customary 
practices should work together must be examined and exploring what roles these 
institutions play in the process of accessing farmland by youth is the concern of 
this paper. 
 
Objectives of the Study 
 
This paper explores the role and influence of formal and informal institutions in 
the community working at both household and community levels in permitting 
and prohibiting the rural youth’s access to (farm) land. Particularly, it describes 
how the access to farmland is established by formal and informal institutional 
setups and what roles each have and assesses the responses of the rural youth to 
these institutions. Moreover it explains why investigations of institutions are 
important to look into the rural life of the youth, and find out opportunities and 
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Scope of the study 
 
This research concentrates on how the youth in Rural Wenago and Dara access 
farmland by considering 13 selected rural kebele administration units (RKAUs), 
of which 8 and 5 were from Dara and Wenago weredas respectively. The study 
mainly focuses on the formal and informal institutions working for and/or against 
the rural youth to access farmland. It also looks at the possible ways of 
harmonizing these institutions to work for the easing of access to available land.  
 
 
Significance of the study 
 
As to its significance the study will partly fill the knowledge gaps and raise 
awareness about permissible and/or unacceptable roles of those formal and 
informal institutions in Dara and Wenago in making young people get access or 
not to farmland. It also helps us understand where and why formal and/or informal 
institutions can be important or not. 
 
 
Conceptualization and Review of Related Literature 
 
Mapping the Conceptual Terrain  
 
Institutions can be usefully defined as complexes of norms and behaviors that 
persist over time by serving socially valued purposes. Institutions understood in 
this way can function either as organizations- defined as structures of recognized 
or accepted roles that serve particular purposes, persisting patterns of behavior 
with a normative dimension, i.e., some sense that people ought to cooperate or 
comply. The latter, not being structured in terms of roles, do not function on the 
basis of such structure, but rather they depend on norms (Watson 2003). 
Informal Institutions: Informal rules are traditions, customs, moral values, 
religious beliefs and all other norms of behavior that have passed the test of time. 
They are often called the old ethos, the hand of the past, or the carriers of history. 
They embody the community’s prevailing perceptions about the world, the 
accumulated wisdom of the past, and a current set of values. Thus, informal 
institutions are part of a community’s heritage that is called culture. They are 
maintained from one generation to another through various transmission 
mechanisms such as imitation, oral tradition, and teaching. The enforcement of 
informal rules takes place by means of sanctions such as expulsion from the 
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community, ostracism by friends and neighbors, or loss of reputation. In the 
process of enforcing informal rules, tribal chiefs and religious leaders have been 
(and, in some parts of the world, still are) known to use more severe forms of 
punishment. On the other hand, some argue that customary institutions more or less 
negotiated, but unchanging and less likely affected by influences from other places or 
people; but they are characterized by particular constellations of power (Pejovich 
1999; Watson 2003). 
Formal institutions: Formal rules are constitutions, statutes, common law, 
and other governmental regulations. They determine the political system (i.e., the 
governance structure and individual rights), the economic system (i.e., property 
rights and contracts), and the enforcement system (i.e., the judiciary and the 
police). Governmental authorities enforce formal rules by means of sanctions such 
as fines, imprisonment, and execution (Pejovich 1999). Formal institutions are 
statutory and are commanded and are at the disposal of modification and change 
(Watson 2003). 
For the purpose of clarity, institutions and organizations should also be raised 
here. Writers like Watson (2003) and Ostrom (1990) briefly consider definitions 
and typologies that make the variables of concern more analytical and concrete. 
Watson (2003) indicated a distinction between institutions and organizations. In 
much of the literature, the terms institution and organization are also used 
interchangeably. Some institutions are also organizations, and vice versa, some 
organizations, though not all, are institutions. On the other hand, there are some 
institutions which are not organizations-and some organizations that are not 
institutions (Ostrom 1990).  
 
Conceptualizing Policies and Institutions in the Context of Rural 
Livelihood 
 
Rural livelihoods are activities of the rural people used to earn a means of living 
using available rural resources which mostly are influenced by formal and/or 
informal institutions. They are dependent on natural resources as sources of 
income.  
Policies and institutions are an important set of external factors that influence 
the range of livelihood option open to different categories of people, including 
access to assets and vulnerability to shocks. They influence household livelihood 
strategies directly, by determining which activities are legal/illegal and 
appropriate/inappropriate for women and men, adult and youth, by creating 
incentives to pursue certain activities and choices over others. They are 
influencing also perceptions of the effectiveness of particular strategies for 
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achieving desired outcomes. An enabling policy and institutional environment 
makes it easier for people – both the poor and the less or non-poor – to gain access 
to assets they need for their livelihoods. A disabling policy and institutional 
environment may discriminate against the poor, thus making it difficult for them 
to get access to land, livestock, capital and information (Ostrom 1990, Agrawal 
2001).  
The term institution can be taken to refer both to membership of an 
organization and the invisible, historical set of rules of the game that govern 
socioeconomic, cultural and political life. This includes the basic building blocks of 
society, such as families, kinship, marriage, inheritance, access to and/or property 
rights, markets and land tenure (Box 1) 
 
Box 1: Examples of rural institutions 
• Formal membership organizations: cooperatives, registered groups, farmer 
groups, community-based organizations 
• Informal organizations: exchange labor groups, rotating saving groups 
• Political institutions: parliament, law and order, political parties at national 
and local level 
• Economic institutions: markets, private companies, banks, land rights, tax 
system, sharing draught oxen 
• Social-cultural institutions: kinship, marriage, inheritance, religion, 
solidarity groups 
Source: Agrawal 2001:1450 
 
 
Access to Farmland and Institutions 
 
How do formal and informal institutions relate to one another when it comes to 
access, use and control over rural land? Gore (1993) suggests that they co-exist, 
but also interact in a complex and dynamic manner. Within these institutions 
numerous conflicting or competing rule-orders exist, characterized more often 
than not by ‘ambiguities, inconsistencies, gaps, conflicts and the like’ (Cousins 
1997). In times of scarcities of livelihood resources, informal rule-orders can take 
precedence over legal property rights as rules of entitlement to food or other 
commodities (Gore 1993). 
Despite the apparent abundance of land, agricultural land with a dependable 
growing period represents a fraction of the total land area of Ethiopia. Moreover, 
land degradation is extensive and severe, particularly in the highlands that are 
above 1500 meters above sea level and accounts for about 40 percent of the total 
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land area, but it is home for about 90 percent of the total population and 70 
percent of the livestock of Ethiopia (Ege 2000). Population continues to grow 
rapidly in these highlands and exert pressure on diminishing supplies of 
agricultural land, particularly arable land for cultivation and pasture (Ege 2000: 
15). There are signs of declining farm size and increased fragmentation, and 
excess demand for land such as pushing cultivation onto marginal lands (i.e., steep 
slopes, low rainfall zone), proliferation of rural landlessness, and increasing land 
rentals (Dessalegn 1995). 
The African evidence indicates that as land becomes scarce, tenure regimes 
(or, property rights) evolve towards individualized land rights (Platteau 1996). 
The evolutionary process is not, however, a smooth progression; either indigenous 
institutions are not capable to meet sufficiently the growing demands for 
individual land rights and/or public policy acts in a way that negates the 
evolutionary process (Yigremew 2002). 
The Ethiopian cases reviewed in this paper exemplify the retarding effect of a 
deficient public policy that is not fully informed by underlying demand and supply 
conditions that necessitate tenure change. Despite the government’s deliberate 
land policy to do away grossly with the past tenure systems, there is evidence that 
indicates farmers are expressing preference towards individualized market based 
tenure system for agricultural land such as land rental. But such self-evolving 
process is not as operative and effective. Paradoxically, government intervention 
is still necessary. However, it has to be informed to meet the changing demands 
for land rights that are consistent with the desirable societal goals of equity, 
efficiency and environmental sustainability (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003).  
Where induced institutional innovation is slow, public policy has an 
important role in hastening the process, thereby closing the gap between the 
demand for and supply of land. Public policy has pivotal role particularly in 
ensuring expanding choices for access to land, providing legal protection and 
enforcement to land rights with social legitimacy, enhancing awareness to 
overcome resistance to change rooted in existing social norms and values that are 
not justifiable on equity ground such as excluding rights to women, children, and 
youth (Yigremew 2002). But public policy and formal laws may have also 
diluting effect on evolving land rights and capacity of indigenous institutions to 
respond to demand pressures. For example, where government owns land and 
exercises control rights, farmers may become less secured as compared to 
indigenous rights. Where tradability of land rights is restricted, farmers can have 
weak command on informal land markets, especially where both legal recognition 
and social legitimacy are deficient. Rights that are legally recognized may not be 
considered socially legitimate if statutory laws fail to recognize social norms and 
values. It is plausible that right to land (access) degenerates where public policy 
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and statutory laws undermine indigenous institutions. Public policy, instead of 
strengthening these institutions and enhancing conditions that are favorable 
towards innovative tenure arrangement that is consistent with increased security of 
tenure, efficient use of land, and conflict prevention, rather hastens the erosion of 
indigenous institutions (Ostrom 1992). 
One of the weapons of formal institutions is land policy. Land policy has 
been the source of power in all governments of Ethiopia including the current one. 
It is also at the center of a controversial policy debate. The debate has largely been 
carried out along two antagonistic lines concerning property rights to land. The 
Ethiopian government continues to advocate state ownership of land whereby only 
usufruct rights are bestowed upon landholders. The usufruct rights exclude the 
right to sell or mortgage the land. This, the government asserted, was to protect 
the rural peasants from selling off their land to wealthy individuals leaving them 
landless and without source of livelihoods (Yigremew 2002, Ege 2000).  
In the ancestral Gedeo and Sidama philosophy land belongs to the tribe and 
women are prohibited from inheriting tribal and family land. The youth, as 
emerging households, either look for land in the parent’s lot or ask the tribal 
leaders if extra farmland is available. Currently tribal involvement for land is 
almost weak as the land is already scarce, but the majority of emerging 
households depend on their parents’ land (Tadesse 2002).  
The controversy in Sidama and Gedeo is the mismatch between the scarce 
land resource and the increasing young population with an average growth rate of 
three percent. Formal institutions have exacerbated land shortage problems by 
inappropriate interventions, often by ambitious development plans, lacking basic 




Description of the Study area and the Research Methodology 
 
Description of the Study Area 
 
Wenago is one of the five weredas in Gedeo Zone, SNNPR (see figure 1). It has 
three major livelihood zones. It is bordered in the south by Yirgachefe wereda, in 
the west by the Oromia Region, in the north by the Sidama Zone (Dara Wereda), 
in the east by Bule wereda and in the northeast by Dilla Zuria wereda. The main 
administrative town of Wenago wereda is also a town called Wenago. According 
to CSA (2007), Wenago has 12 kilometers long asphalt roads, 56 kilometers of 
all-weather roads and 17 kilometers of dry-weather roads. This gives an average 
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road density of 333 meters per km2. Local landmarks include the Qallu compound 
(galma) of Guji, which the local communities  claim ought to be annexed by Guji 
Zone of the Oromia Region, the claim which led to violence in the past 
particularly in 1995 and 1998 (CSA 2005, Hussien 2004). 
Astronomically, the wereda is located between 6.220 to 6.420 latitude and 
38.210 to 38.410 longitudes (see Figure 1). The elevation of the wereda ranges 
from 1401 to 2500 meters above sea level. It has sub-humid tropical climate, 
receives mean annual rainfall of 1500, with a range of 1200 to 1800 mm. The 
rainfall pattern is bimodal, with short rain season between March and 
May, accounting for 30 percent of total rainfall, and a long rainy season between 
July and October, accounting for more than 60 percent of total rainfall. The mean 
monthly temperature is 21.5oC with mean monthly maximum and minimum 
temperatures of 25oC and 18oC, respectively. 
Wenago wereda has a total population size of 117,630, of whom 49.75 
percent are male and 50.25 percent are female; 25.36 percent of its populations are 
urban dwellers which is more than the Zone average of 14.4 percent. With an area 
of 255.16 square kilometers, the wereda has a population density of 1,086.30 
people per square kilometer. This is probably one of the most densely populated 
areas (at wereda level) in the country (CSA 2005). The five largest ethnic groups 
that inhabited the area have been Gedeo (73.5%), Amhara (6.98%), Oromo 
(6.37%), Sidama (3.34%), Siltie (2.33%) and all other ethnic groups account for 
7.48% of the population. The largest religious group was Protestants accounting 
for about 45.92 percent of the population, while 26.06 percent practiced Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christianity, 16.96 percent were followers of traditional beliefs, 4.66 
percent were Muslims, and 2.56 percent were Catholics (CSA 2005, 2007).  
In Wenago wereda, as it is for the whole wereda in the Gedeo Zone, due to 
the ongoing diminution of land because of growing population size and heritage, 
households working on a large single field are few. Some households operate 
several fields, dispersed within a walking distance from peasant’s farmhouse. 
Households from related families, their heads being sons of the same farmer, often 
form a cluster of huts, group settlements. However, each keeps a farmhouse 
(uranee) on his own plot. This system is attributed to a polygamous marriage 
among the Gedeos. About 66 percent of the farm households in Wenago wereda 
hold less than 0.5 hectare of land which is more than the zone average of 54 
percent (Tadesse 2002). 
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           Figure 1: Map of study Weredas, Kebeles and Livelihood zones 
           Source: Filed Pictures and own Construction on the basis of Ethio-GIS 2009 
 
Dara is one of the 19 weredas in Sidama Zone, which is located north of 
Gedeo zone. It has also three livelihood zones. It is bordered in the south by 
Gedeo Zone and in the east and west by the Oromia region, in the northwest by 
Aleta Wendo wereda, and in the northeast by Hula wereda. Towns found in Dara 
include Kebado and Teferi Kela. It was a very recent phenomenon that the number 
of weredas in the Sidama Zone increased from 10 to 19. Astronomically, Dara 
wereda is situated between 6.360 to 6.540 latitude and 38.260 to 38.510 longitudes. 
The elevation of the wereda ranges from 1001 to 3000 meters above sea level. The 
mean annual temperature and rainfall are slightly greater than the zone average 
(see Table 4.1). Dara Wereda has 8 kilometers long asphalt road, 66 kilometers of 
all-weather roads and 16 kilometers of dry-weather roads; hence the average road 
density of the area was 369 meters per square kilometer area (CSA, 2005). The 
wereda has a total population of 157, 866, of whom 49.29 are male and 50.71 
were female; 6.19 percent of its population are urban dwellers. With an area of 
250.8 square kilometers, it has a population density of 616.4 people per square 
kilometer, which is more than the Zonal average of 430.03 (CSA, 2007). The seat 
of wereda administration is Kebado found at a distance of 355 kilometer south of 
Addis Ababa.  
The four largest ethnic groups of Dara wereda were the Sidama (89.68%), 
Amhara (5.28%), Siltie (1.62%), and Oromo (1.37%); all other ethnic groups 
accounted for 2.05 percent of the population. Sidama is spoken as the first 
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language by 92.54 percent of the inhabitants and 5.42 percent speak Amharic; the 
remaining 2.04 percent spoke all other primary languages. About 64.4 percent of 
the populations were adherent of Protestant Christianity, 15.82 percent practice 
traditional believes, 11.85 percent practiced Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, 4.23 
percent were Muslim, and 1.4 percent Catholic.  
 
  Table 1: Study location characteristics (2007) 
 
                Some statistics 
weredas 
Wenago  Dara 
Total Population  117,630 157, 866  
Total youth population (15-29 age) 28452 
(24.3%) 
40418(26.0%) 
Average household size 8.0 7.3 
No. of kebeles (smallest admin unit) 16 33 
No. of sample kebeles taken 5 8 
Sample HHs 30 30 
Sample youth 90 90 
   Source: CSA, 2007; Field Survey, 2011  
 
Land issues are associated with population and demographic situation. About 
24 percent of the population in Wenago and 26 percent in Dara are youth, lower 
than the national average (28%). Sample kebeles were taken proportionally and 
eight were from Dara and five from Wenago. Equal number of households (30) and 
youth (90) were taken from each wereda purposely. The 90 young persons from 
each Wereda were sons and/or daughters of sample households. Accordingly, three 
young persons from each household were selected in descending order of their age.  
 
 
Methodology: Procedures, Data Sources and Analysis 
    
The study has applied a qualitative research method to illustrate the influence and 
roles of formal and informal institutions to access farmland by rural youth. It also 
used the method to portray affiliations of the rural youth towards local institutions.  
Both primary and secondary data sources were employed. Primary data was 
collected from sample respondents using questionnaire survey, personal 
observations, structured interview and focus group discussions (see table 1). In 
order to broaden the source of information, key informant interview and some 
individual case histories were gathered and analyzed.  
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Table 2: Sampling framework and selection of respondents for questionnaire 
Source: Own compilation, 2012 
 
Wenago of Gedeo and Dara of Sidama were selected purposively: A) Both 
zones are known for high scarcity of livelihood resources particularly land. About 
65 percent of the population owns less than 0.5 hectare per household (Tadesse 
2002). B) Both Weredas are full of physical diversities following the three major 
agro-ecological zones/livelihood zones (Maize, Coffee and Enset/Barley based). 
C) Demographic dynamics and settlement pattern was another factor of selection. 
Both areas are known for highest population density in the region and in the 
country (CSA, 2007).  
The Kebeles (based on the agro ecological/livelihood zones) and the study 
subjects (HHs and youth) were selected randomly. However, amongst the 
randomly selected kebeles and households, three kebeles from three agro-
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purposively to pursue those households which had young people of 15-29 years of 
age, who rely for their livelihood on the rural settings. This was done so because 
all households that were randomly selected did not have youth of the given age 
category. These young people were considered the main focus of the study. 
Respondents for interview and group discussion (both heads of HHs and youth) 
are selected randomly out of the respondents selected for questionnaire survey. 
Observation of all livelihood realities was also made. From the available youth, 
the oldest youth is listed as number 1; the second is number 2, and so on. 
Willingness to participate in the study was what mattered most. This is because 
some young girls were unwilling to participate because of some cultural reasons 
and misunderstandings. Three groups of youth were selected and three groups of 
elderly people, of which one group is women, were selected purposely for group 
discussion.  
Secondary data was gathered from various sources like Wereda Bureaus of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, CSA, and office of Zone/Wereda Finance 
and Economic Development. 
In presenting individual case studies, interview results, focus group 
discussions and personal observations and an overall account for some cases was 
given qualitatively. Simple statistics was used to analyze quantitative data 
obtained through questionnaire survey and interview. Besides, analysis was made 
to assess the determining factors of the means of accessing land either formally or 
informally or both by young people.   
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The Property Rights of the Youth and Rural Institutions 
 
Assets are properties that give meaning to a person’s world and constitute an 
essential element of livelihood. Natural capital is one of such assets that the term 
used for the natural resource stocks (e.g., land resources) upon which people rely. 
Access to these assets is usually problematic as it is a function of formal/informal 
institutions and statutory and/or customary practices among communities of 
Sidamas and Gedeos. 
One of the main functions of a family is ensuring the transfer of property 
rights from one generation to the next, i.e. from parents to children. The work of 
Nzioki (2007) shows that if parents fail to make custody arrangements, their 
children are at a greater risk of long-term negative outcomes. It was observed and 
also understood from the information obtained from elders of Sidama and Gedeo 
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that the main challenge of a family has been the inability to ensure inheritance of 
the main assets like land and other properties for children and the youth. This is 
mainly attributed to shortage of land and scarcity of livelihood resources due to 
increasing number of people among household members. This was more 
exacerbated and became more serious particularly when parents die and caretakers 
(givers) and family members enter into strife and conflicts during sharing of 
family land and other properties. This is because access to livelihood assets like 
the right to own and use land, livestock and other agrarian resources are critical to 
livelihoods of rural children and youth after the death of parents. 
Property rights are shaped by many actors ranging from individuals to 
institutions. In this case, the right and access to land depends on the response of a 
combination of authorities such as the state, local authorities, and customary 
leaders. In rural Gedeo and Sidama, as it is in most countries of Africa, women 
and children’s access and rights to land and property depend on their relationship 
to their male family members as a wife, daughter, sister or mother, though with 
some exceptions. The case is especially serious where matrilineal kinship system 
is practiced, their gender as male or female, their proximity and relationship to the 
head of the household, before and after his/her death.  
The youth often find that their right to family land is challenged by family 
elders. A young man aged 27, at Hatile Fulanto kebele narrated:  
  
I was supposed to have some land when my father died last year but my two 
elder brothers took it away. I and Genet, my younger sister, are now without 
land. They are using the crops grown up on the land for their own benefit. I 
asked my uncle to settle the issue peacefully. He suppressed my idea and said to 
me that you are a child and Genet is female. So please, he said, let your brothers 
think by themselves, and most probably they will give you something out of the 
harvest of your parents’ land. I kept quiet hoping for something positive in the 
future but I am doubtful. 
 
This experience tells us that family and its networks as one of the informal 
institutions can affect the probability of accessing farmland positively or 
negatively.  
Property is a bundle of rights entailing a set of entitlements as well as a set of 
obligations. In order for these rights to be secured they need to be enforced by an 
authority. As outlined by the Food and Agricultural Organization, property rights 
and property relations can be the subject of negotiation and compromise on the 
one hand and confrontation and struggle on the other, and these struggles can be 
violent in various ways (Nzioki 2007). Although legal rights may exist in 
principle, they are not always respected in practice as customary rules co-exist.  
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Two scenarios can be identified as far as property rights and owning land in 
Wenago and Dara is concerned. These are collective property rights, which are 
also connected with collective livelihood and communal property rights. Children 
from their early years of age work towards the strength, survival and continuance 
of the collective livelihood of the family. They share more obligations in the 
family than rights. This is true both in Gedeo and Sidama. 
Shared livelihoods are peculiar characteristic of both Gedeo and Sidama. 
Shared livelihoods are also called collective livelihoods (Tatek 2007). It refers to 
the situation when every member of the family is working for the family 
members, i.e. they shared roles and also shared outputs. Most of the youths either 
directly or indirectly reflect the collective livelihood issues. These tasks are 
organized entirely on the basis of division of labor, with virtually no household 
co-operation. This coexistence and collaboration is expected to help the youth to 
inherit an asset including land out of the property of the household during 
retirement or death of the head of the household. Accordingly, the major types of 
land tenure in rural South Ethiopia, particularly in Sidama and Gedeo, can be 
crudely lumped into common property and lineage controlled. The head of the 
lineage has authority to allocate land to those with need as it pleases him. The 
youth have no right to question except taking what is allocated for them. 
A common property right of the youth on the other hand is emerging. It 
indicates that when the youth are organized in groups through youth development 
programs and have a group access to use and control land in groups. It was 
indicated by Ato Ashenafi, Youth and Sport Officer of Dara Wereda, that the 
youth are being organized in groups and are working towards a collective property 
right, particularly land, because of the absence of farmland to distribute to the 
youth. In this kind of land owning process, the youth who are married are given 
priority. The information obtained from Dara Wereda youth affairs office 
indicated that the property ownership of the youth has changed from a private type 
to a collective type for those who are part of the rural youth development package. 
But, he also added that the land which is distributed to these groups of youth is 
already degraded and scrappy.  
When asked about the issue of equal right and access to agricultural land to 
the agricultural community, an officer in the land administration office of Wenago 
wereda said that:  
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It is not the regulations that are working but the reality in our locality that 
matters. The law contains provisions that aim to protect children’s property and 
inheritance rights; the reality is that we do not have land for ‘the newly born 4’. 
We have also our own traditions on property rights and inheritance issues. 
Children and the youth should also be able to abide by the rules and regulations 
embedded in the community; otherwise they might be regarded as deviants. This, 
I am telling you because I am totally supporting these local traditions but it is 
there, it is as old as the people of Gedeo are. Some youth tried to challenge the 
community but gradually they saw that it does not work for the time being and 
therefore they opted to remain silent and try to survive by being engaged in non-
farm rural activities. That means they are not able to utilize the laws to protect 
themselves from land impoverishment. Therefore bridging the gap between 
statutory law and customary law remains a significant challenge, as the latter 
dominates in practice. 
 
 
Box 2 deals with one of the most densely populated kebeles. Both historical and 
cultural contexts of community ownership and right of distribution of land were 
described by the two key informants. Land related issues - ownership approval, 
land distribution and land based conflicts were handled and resolved by the 
community leaders. The land related problem seems to be a recent phenomenon 
connected with population pressure. It is also indicated that ownership right is not 
according to the land policy of the government: it is more of informal. Customary 






4Indicates youth who recently married and looking for agricultural land. 
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Box 2: Traditional land allocation process in Gedeo 
 
Ato Shibiru (Male, 75) narrates his story as follows: until about 1941, commercial 
farming system was virtually unknown to the local population. All lands belonged to the 
community who has had the highest say on land. Although the community leaders 
historically held the largest amount of land, every single member of the community had 
the right of access to land except women and children.  Every member of community 
(man) was entitled access to and cultivates any vacant piece of land available. In the 
absence of vacant land, an individual or a family could cut trees down and open new 
fields. A simple word of approval from the elders and households was enough to turn a 
piece of forestland to cropland. The leaders would also grant the right to use wood 
resources that lie adjacent to the crop field. Water and grazing land was also shared 
communally. The Gedeo used to encourage people, particularly men, from other areas to 
settle and marry in their village. The community elders would allocate a parcel of land of 
less than 0.5 ha in the first year of settlement and progressively increase the area 
depending on the social and moral conduct of the newcomer. Although land allocation was 
done based on specific criteria for different people who were in need of it, the ability to 
behave according to the norms that governed community life carried the greatest weight in 
the decision to allocate land to an individual or family. This could only have been possible 
in a situation where the economic supply of land was adequate.  
 
An elderly man (86) who lived in Mokonnisa Kebele, also stressed that in the old days 
“there was no as such land ownership problem and was not a big deal because there was a 
plenty of land”. The ownership right granted by the elders was fully acknowledged by the 
rest of the community and ensured ownership security. For the native families, land was 
passed on from one generation to the next. Moreover land access was not only through 
inheritance. People also used to borrow fields from each other, particularly old people who 
could not manage large fields due to lack of family labor. For men, to let somebody use 
(borrowing) a field was a reflection of incapability. It was recalled in Gedeo that a “father 
would never allow his daughter to marry a man who does not let others use his unused 
land. There was sufficient land available, although it was restricted only to males. But now 
it has become a story. Whoever cleared a field first was considered the owner unless it was 
formally handed back to the Abba Gada who was the caretaker of all community issues – 
advising and deciding concerning land is one of their responsibilities. Some people rarely 
encountered land conflicts because the community leaders (they) used to allocate land well 
aware that it was the most important resource.  
Source: Field notes, 2011 
 
Complementarities of Formal and Informal Institutions  
 
Generally, control over and access to farmland is in the hands of the lineage that 
was the first to start farming in the village, personified in the (male) head of that 
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lineage (Tadesse 2002). Wives and unmarried boys and girls will receive land to 
cultivate through their husbands, mother-in-law or parents but can never own and 
control it. 
Many studies indicated that interest in “formalizing” access to land and 
transactions is increasing in Africa, particularly in areas where pressure on land is 
increasing. Informal land markets are spreading. Disputes may have a generational 
dimension when elders decide to sell the land without consulting the younger 
generations, or conversely, when people sell family land without asking for 
permission from ‘custodians’. Policy responses are oriented towards promoting 
registration such as the right of using land, and in the Ethiopian case, marketing is 
forbidden (Tadesse 2002, Ege 2000, Platteau 1996, Ostrom 1992). Currently the 
Ethiopian government has introduced new ways of owning land for rural young 
people following the 2006 Rural Youth Development Package. It is also 
connected to sustainable land management of Gedeo and Sidama agro-forestry. 
 
… there is land allocated for one of the youth associations by government 
officials near Adame Tesso Kebele but disagreement erupted because the land 
belongs to the community and it is a place where herders and community 
children keep the community’s cattle. Actually the land is not productive but we 
need it for bee farming if we are allowed. So look at … promises and practices 
are here and there… they are unable to negotiate and give us the land promised 
before a year” says a young man, 22, who is from Hatile Fulanto kebele. 
 
Still strategies to get access to land are diverse - formal and informal. With respect 
to farmland, sharecropping and renting is still very common. Young people utilize 
these opportunities in some cases as a means of accessing farmland. This practice 
is more common in Dara than in Wenago. When asked about the land he is 
cultivating, a young man in Adame Tesso Kebele5 of Dara said “…it is not my 
plot…I will give half of the entire product to him.” The land belongs to an old 
man who has no caretaker.  
The traditional rural community leaders (elders) are not only responsible for 
land cases but for all aspects of life within their locale. Their influence is 




5 A small administrative locale of Ethiopia 
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practices are still operating more in Gedeo than in Sidama, although the traditional 
rules are getting eroded due to the imposition of formal rules and institutions. The 
legitimacy and authority of the traditional community leaders is based on a 
mixture of customary and religious laws, and social agreements (norms). 
However, some chiefs who are now called ‘customary’ acquired their powers in 
connection with traditional rituals and cultural norms. While these institutions 
reflect existing social agreements, they also replicate prevailing forms of 
discrimination, exclusion and prejudice, such as those that affects the rights of 
women, children and the youth.  
It was observed that social configurations and agreements underlying the 
more ‘customary’ institutions for resource management evolve continuously in 
response to internal and external transformations. The trend within these 
communities that will affect these institutions and their effectiveness include: 
changing relations between generations; breaking apart of large families into 
smaller units; the undermining of the notion of custodianship under the influence 
of emerging (informal) land markets; the growing ‘influence of political party 
memberships’ on social relations (sometimes also linked to local government 
elections including kebele chairman).  
“Customary” local governance institutions, such as village chiefs used to be 
effective in exercising authority over access to and use of land and natural 
resources, and resolving conflicts. Although their relevance continues in most 
rural areas, their powers have been undermined. The destabilization of these 
institutions started during the derg regime when every institutional setup was 
expected to shout socialism, and continued until now in the time of EPRDF, 
reflecting the growing power of the formal institutions, the expansion of statutory 
law, and changing social relations and new markets. It was also reflected by key 
informants that government uses more informal institutions than formal ones for 
conflict management and resolution.  
Ministries in charge of land, youth and formal institutions increasingly 
intervened in overseeing the use of resources like land, while issuing users permits 
often without taking into consideration the availability of the resources. There was 
no recourse available to the ‘customary” authorities who used to govern resource 
use. This situation is increasingly affecting the sustainable management of shared 
resources, creating situations of conflict that may lead to worsening of family and 
community members’ relationships. 
So, the point here is to try to combine “customary” and “modern” 
institutions, while seeking to anchor the results to the legal authority of formal 
government system. As a result of the lack of implementation of state legislation 
and of the continued application of customary law, several legal systems – 
statutory, customary and a range of “in-betweens” - regulate resource rights in the 
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same territory, resulting in overlapping rights, contradictory rules and competing 
authorities. In Sidama and Gedeo, the neat distinction between “customary” and 
“statutory” land tenure systems is considerably blurred, and the dichotomy 
between the two must be avoided.  
In both Gedeo and Sidama communities of Dara and Wenago, “customary” 
systems have been much imbedded in the community since time immemorial with 
interference by statutory ones. Equally, statutory systems for land management 
usually operate with considerable possibilities for negotiation, and it is not 
uncommon for government officials to follow customary law principles to settle 
natural resource disputes on the basis of mediation and conciliation. Between the 
ideal-type “customary” and the ideal-type “statutory”, a great deal of hybrids and 
“in-betweens” exist. Farmers might have registered their land, thereby converting 
their customary rights into user rights or it is title registration (Solomon, n.d); but 
not updated the register following succession or sales. It does not also indicate the 
fate of women and the youth in the registration process (Solomon (n.d.). In many 
disputes over land rights, parties selectively refer to bits of both customary and 
statutory law, choosing those norms and dispute settlement institutions that better 
support their claims. In other words, resource users gain access to natural 
resources through a blend of “customary” and “statutory” arrangements. Rather 
than a dichotomy between opposing extremes, local reality usually resembles 
more a continuum of different combinations of both.  
 
 
Conflicts Co-exist in Formal and Informal Institutions in Wenago and 
Dara   
 
Although the issue is not thoroughly investigated, as a result of formal policies 
and customary practices, ‘conflicts’ over access to and rights on land are central 
and seem unavoidable. The following types of conflicts that co-exist in formal and 
informal rules/institutions were identified in Wenago and Dara. Conflict between: 
 
• traditional community leaders and local government officials over land 
administration powers of functions; 
•  heads of households and able bodied members of the household over land; 
•  men (and traditional community leaders in particular) and women over 
gender equality in relation to land rights; 
• traditional community leaders and emerging adults/young people on who 
should control/use the available land and how to access the available land; and 
• local groupings with competing visions of the desired form of ownership, or 
over the content of internal rules, or over boundaries between sub-groups. 




All of these factors mean that at present the rights, duties, responsibilities and 
powers of the social actors and institutions operating at different levels on 
communal land administration are ambiguous, conflicting, and highly contested. 
Again, it is clear that enacting the proposed law will not by itself resolve the 
conflicts; it may create a framework within which processes of ‘democratization’ 
of land rights can occur, but active agents will have to press their claims and 
struggle to make their rights realities.  
 
Rural Youth and the Problem of Access to Farmland 
 
As it is in many other rural parts of Ethiopia, the problem of landlessness has been 
increasing in both the study communities. Landless poor families and young 
people were observed engaging in many income-generating activities. The rural 
youth who came ‘late’ to the scene are at high risk of being landless. Since there 
has not been a comprehensive survey in both communities as well as in the 
country, data derived from small sample surveys portray the state of landlessness. 
The findings of these surveys are divergent and inconclusive on the size of the 
landless population with age while all of them concur on the seriousness of the 
problem and its increase at an alarming rate (Dessalegn 1995). Now the problem 
with landlessness is not only because land is scarce. Partly, it has been observed 
that the problem is ‘who should do what’ among formal and informal institutions 
to make accessible the available land. Easily cultivable land is found more in Dara 
than in Wenago but conflict of interest between them sometimes permits and 
mostly prohibits access.  
Land is the most precious item to the Gedeos because among them it 
functions as a membership card. This goes so far as saying that a “man without 
land among the Gedeo is not considered a fully developed human being” (Tadesse 
2002). Landlessness in Sidama is also exacerbated by the mismatch between the 
limited land resources, role confusion and conflict of interest between formal and 
informal institutions and the growing youth population who needs land. For 
example, Gedeo population is growing annually on average at more than three 
percent (CSA 2007). The majority of the households own less than 0.5 hectare of 
land who at the same time are responsible to sustain more than 8 household 
members each. 
Therefore, a combination of shortage of agricultural land, the customary 
practices and statutory rules have exacerbated the problem of access to land. One 
of the problems is corruption and discrimination against some background of 
people.  
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When I raise the issue of corruption I know it is difficult to bring to the forefront, 
supported with evidences but what I need to show here is that corruption in different 
forms is one of the greatest challenges of young people today. They are young after 
all. They lack life experiences, their social capital is limited compared with adults or 
the social capital that they have already built up is weak; they are not in a position to 
predict the consequences of things yet to come, etc. They are therefore an easy prey to 
the teeth of corruption. Access to land, sharing public spaces of any type, earning of 
benefits from something, etc. all are subject to certain forms of linkage or sabotage, 
even among elders and community leaders (see box 3).  
 
  Box 3: Problem of Access to Land: Corruption 
Hailu (26), one of the interviewees from Dara coffee growing village, reported saying, “ 
we usually have access to land if we can afford to buy a piece of land with perennial crops. 
I bought a piece of land from someone; I paid a small amount of money and later on, 
another man came who paid for the same land a bigger amount. And the owner told me to 
leave the plot and he gave me back the money,” saying "This land was for that man there 
[and] I gave it to you because that man was not coming. But now that he is around so give 
me back my land and here is your money." Really, such things happen often. The local 
authorities can do nothing because some of these people are part of the authorities, so they 
can even order someone to leave the plot in 24 hours. Or there are some conditions to get 
land from the community. But such kinds of practices are secret and done more 
informally. There are some people from towns, who come here and create such problems 
on us just because they want to occupy a piece of coffee land to cultivate, while those 
without economic power continue in absolute poverty. [Such people] accentuate and 
increase our poverty.  
Source: Hailu (2010), Interviewee  
 
So, what has been learnt from Hailu’s story is that there is an encroachment 
of land by outsiders while the insiders are already land starved. Although this case 
is taken from Sidama (Dara) there are also similar cases in Gedeo (Wenago). 
The role of the state also contributes to erosion of indigenous institutions 
where statutory laws fail to recognize the role of customary laws and/or 
indigenous institutions become politicized such as appointing traditional leaders 
as local officials. These (traditional) officials often mix up and confuse customary 
and statutory rules.  
There are also other factors as well that contribute to the worsening of the 
already dire situation of the rural youth with respect to access to land. Two of 
these explanations are related to recent demographic trends in both Gedeo and 
Sidama. First, the rapid population growth has induced a transition from 
abundance of land to scarcity of land, from land owner to land borrower, from 
land inheritor to land seller, etc. situations in many villages of Gedeo and Sidama.  
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The situation is more prevalent in the highly populated and cultivated part of 
the coffee growing villages of both Gedeo and Sidama. The situation is still more 
appalling in Gedeo where most of the villages are sustaining more than 1000 
persons per square kilometer. Increased population pressure on land resulting 
from the transition could be expected to have resulted in a decrease in terms of 
areas available for younger generations. Second, increased life expectancy could 
have resulted in late access to land for younger generations. Aman (23), a youth 
respondent from Hase Haroa kebele, Wenago, indicated that “the number of 
young people who seek land is increasing. Only a few succeed. Due to limited 
availability of land more young people move to towns to seek better livelihoods. 
Currently, looking for other livelihood strategies (options) is becoming a must and 
not optional”.  
This seems also true in other parts of Ethiopia. According to Dessalegn 
(1995) younger generations in Ethiopia cannot claim new fertile land nor invest on 
land. As a consequence, young adults end up dependent on their families and farm 
plots are subdivided into ever smaller size of parcels, which are becoming 
economically not viable. This consequently resulted in livelihood insecurity 
among young people, increasing rate of dependency, rural-urban migration, 
increased rate of incidents of social evils in both urban and rural areas, social 
unrest, etc. This of course does not mean that land is the only and better option to 
the rural young people. Rather it was also observed in Dara Wereda that some 
young people do not like to remain rural and agricultural even when they are less 
educated. This means that access to farmland and engagement in farming 
activities is not only due to land shortage and impact of institutions but also the 
willingness of individual young people. 
 
 
Gender and Access to Farmland  
  
Access to land was not found as “gender neutral”. Not only being rural, being 
youth in many parts of rural Ethiopia including in Gedeo and Sidama is a 
disadvantage; but being a woman appears to be a more serious problem regarding 
the inheritance of land and getting access to other livelihood strategies.  
Traditionally, women are excluded from inheriting family land. This is the 
historical extension of customary rules linked to the vital priority of protecting the 
life support structure of tribal lands. Since daughters are married off outside their 
own tribe (i.e., marriage within the tribe is prohibited), loss of tribal land through 
inheritance is avoided, as the tribe follows male lines. The tribe of a woman’s 
husband would then acquire the land, not the wife. The husband and his tribe 
would become the owners of the land according to the Gedeo traditional law. This 
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would strongly enhance the risk of accumulation of land in a few hands.  
Daughters in Gedeo society are known as manna, i.e., foreigners. That means they 
are only born to be given away to another tribe. A young woman’s membership to 
her tribe lasts only until her marriage, when she loses her old citizenship and 
becomes a citizen of her husband’s tribe. That is why the Gedeo consider it a 
curse to have a married woman give birth in her mother’s house. In case a married 
woman dies in her parents’ house, the latter are prohibited from performing burial 
ceremony, and they have to take the body to the tribe of her husband. According 
to Taddesse, after all Gedeo women, at first, are only a little more than daily 
laborers, relying on their skills and knowledge in matters regarding the house as 
well as ensete harvesting and processing (Taddesse 2002). 
When we arrived at Hase Haro Kebele (Gedeo) on June 15, 2011 for group 
interviews, village leaders were in a meeting with Mr. Deyasso to resolve a family 
land issue. Many people were surprised about it because it was unusual for a 
young girl to claim a plot of land from her father. We were allowed and took the 
opportunity to attend the meeting (see box 4).  
 
 
Box 4: Can Women Claim Land Rights? Experience from Wenago  
Ato Deyasso had refused to give land to his daughter, Meseret, who had decided to return 
home after divorcing her husband. As in many other cases, she did not have the right, 
traditionally, to inherit land from her father. This is well known in the tradition of Gedeo 
(Tadesse 2002). Since Meseret’s family failed to find a solution to their land problem after 
three consecutive family meetings, Ababa Shibiru and other village leaders were called to 
settle the conflict. Ato Deyasso ranks among the well off village men in Hasemo village. 
He has 5 hectares of land and a number of other assets. He is the father of seven children – 
four girls and three boys. Meseret is the first-born from Deyasso’s first marriage. He 
divorced Meseret’s mother after 12 years of marriage but left no land for her (Meseret’s 
mother) children. Meseret lived with her mother until she got married at the age of 20 to a 
man in another village. It is unfortunate that the marriage did not last more than five years 
because her husband decided to marry another woman. Like many other women without 
land even to feed the children born of him; Meseret went back to her mother’s home with 
her two young children. Meseret’s mother was happy to have her back home with her kids 
but she did not have land. During the first six months at home, Meseret and her mother 
worked together as farm laborers to earn a living. This place is quite comfortable for 
women wage laborers since enset preparation needs time and energy, people usually 
outsource it. The household short-term income increased threefold but it was unreliable in 
the long run. If close-by relatives did not help, Meseret’s children would go hungry during 
labor (trough) slack periods. The problems with Ato Deyasso started when Meseret, his 
first daughter, decided to ask him for a piece of land to work on. Meseret was confident 
that her father would attend to her request positively not just because she was his first 
daughter, but also because he had enough land to share to all his children. Her 
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expectations began to crumble when Ato Deyasso informed her that all his land had 
already been divided among the children from the second marriage. Ato Deyasso never 
expected that Meseret would claim a piece of land from him, but from her mother who 
happens to be landless. After several unfruitful meetings with her farther, Meseret decided 
to take the case to Elders.  At the village meeting, Meseret made her point consistently 
clear: “I have nowhere else to turn to but my father. I am his daughter and he should give 
me some land as he did with his other children. As most of you know he left my mother 
empty … If there is land for others there should be a piece for me too…” Ababa Shibiru, a 
wise 75 years old man, proved that customs are to be adapted to the circumstances of 
community life. Although Meseret did not have inheritance rights to her father’s land, Ato 
Shibiru appealed in her favor. His argument in favor of her was not only that she is a 
daughter but also that he sent her mother away empty handed. Ato Deyasso was to find a 
plot for his divorced daughter. The negotiation was continued and we left the area because 
it was so late. After we left the village, we heard that Meseret has managed to get 0.2 
hectare of land for herself and her mother. 
Source: Field notes, 2011 
 
The lesson from that story of Meseret (box 4) and the final position of her 
father, Ato Deyasso, is that customary practices are being challenged, replaced 
and negotiated.  The influence of Women Affairs Office and awareness creation 
made by some local and international NGOs contributed in favor of women’s 
position including Meseret (This is not simple). The writer purposely followed the 
court cases in Dara and Wenago weredas and there were cases of divorce and 
sharing of resources. This was not common before because most of the cases were 
handled by elders in the villages. An increase in the literacy of women, being 
aware of their property rights from time to time, the education of young people 
and being intolerant of the misery of their mothers were some of the factors that 
started challenging the old customary practices as it was indicated by people 
attending the court and women themselves. Accordingly, sharing of property upon 
divorce is also growing from time to time.  
 
 
Means of Acquiring Land in Dara and Wenago 
 
Concerning means of acquiring farmland, about 83 percent and 90 percent of 
youth respondents from Dara and Wenago, respectively, indicated that land is 
acquired only from parents. Despite the strength of the farmers’ struggle, almost 
no farm household can be fully self-sufficient, mainly due to the inheritance of the 
already scarce land (Tadesse 2002). It is also indicated that the old way of clearing 
and negotiating on community land has become unthinkable in both communities. 
Buying of land, although not allowed by law, is the second important means of 
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acquiring land. Although it was not explained by the respondents, there are other 
ways of acquiring land like in the form of gift from relatives, and old people 
without family labor and caregivers, etc. 
 
 
Table 3: Means of acquiring land by youth in rural Gedeo and Sidama (Note: 
Multiple responses are recorded, percentages in parenthesis) 
I acquired land via Sidama (N=35) Gedeo (N=20) 
Inheritance from parents/relatives 29(83) 18(90) 
Buying/leasing/contracting 7(20) 5(25) 
Clearing of community land/unused 
land 
1(2.8) -- 
Rent from individual farmers 6(17) 2(10) 
Other forms of acquiring 
agricultural land 
4(11.4) 3(15) 
Source: Field Survey, 2010    
 
 
A Glimpse at Rural Youth Development Package: Programs and 
Policies 
 
The Ethiopian government has developed youth development packages for both 
urban and rural areas. The package includes strategies, how young people can be 
eligible to own, manage and control land. It has put down some directions 
concerning land and the rural youth. It primarily focuses on increasing the 
productivity of parents’ land through intensive farming, application of technology 
and modern farm inputs. Then the product will trickle down to benefit children. 
Secondly, it encourages rearranging of the distribution of productive land (if 
available) and/or allocating the available land to the youth who are jobless and 
able to form groups and willing to engage in agriculture. Thirdly, the youth 
development package put the right of using uncultivated and mountainous land for 
those who can still organize themselves in groups. The Office of Youth Affairs of 
the SNNPR has also adopted similar strategies for the young people of the region. 
Key respondents indicated that so far access to land is impractical. 
After realizing the alarmingly growing youth population in the country, the 
Ministry of Youth and Sports formulated the national youth policy in March 2004 
with the broad objective of ensuring the active participation of the youth in the 
economic, social and cultural development endeavor (life) of the country, 
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and to support the process of democratization and ensuring good 
governance. The basic principles of the policy are to ensure that the youth 
will be active participant and beneficiary of the democratization process and 
economic development activities. The policy addresses a wide range of youth 
issues, ranging from HIV/AIDS to environmental protection and social services. 
The Ethiopian government has also formulated the youth development package to 
translate into action the national youth policy based on the formulated strategic 
plan with the view to alleviate the economic, social and political problems of the 
youth. It was said by the official in charge of rural youth development package in 
the SNNPR that the Ethiopian youth development package was developed through 
the full participation of the youth themselves and their organizations at different 
forums, although he did not mention the details of the youth participation during 
the formulation of the policy.  
According to the information obtained from the office in charge (see box 5), 
the package recognizes that the youth are a strategic force for the implementation 
of the youth development package in order to address their problems. According 
to the implementation strategy of the package, participation of young people will 
be promoted at all stages of the program design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. It is also indicated in the package that ‘young people will not only be 
passive implementers of the package that affects their lives but take the leading 












   Source: Dara Wereda youth affairs officer, 2012 
Box.5: Result of interview carried out with Dara wereda Youth Affairs Officer 
about the rural youth development packages and rural micro finances 
services, Dara Wereda 
1. Can you please explain the situation/experiences of the practice of 
small and micro enterprises of rural youth? 
When micro enterprises started operating in the area, they were organized just to 
create jobs to rural youth as stipulated in the rural youth development packages. 
Loan was given to those youth who organized themselves in small and micro 
enterprises. But there was no monitoring and evaluation system. The youth were 
not willing to pay the money they borrowed back because of some misconceptions 
and misunderstandings. They assume that the money belongs to the government 
and as citizens it is their ‘share’ given by the government which is contrary to the 
information provided by the lenders and the regulation. This had been a source of 
conflicts between youth and lenders and government bodies. Currently the situation 
seems improved and more awareness among the youth is created. Accordingly, 
there are activities that the rural youths are engaged in, which include: beef 
fattening, vegetables and fruits production; quarrying; livestock trading; baking (of 
injera and bread); nursery sites and bee keeping. In the wereda there are about 62 
youth income generating groups (organizations). About 7 of them are new and are 
waiting to receive loan from lenders. The majority, about 40 of them, are engaged 
in fattening activities. Most of the programs are urban based however. 
2. Do you think that all the youth who are in need of job are benefiting 
from the programs?  
No, only those who were willing to take part have been beneficiaries and 
participants. Besides, only those who have no jobs after completing high school 
education and those who are dropouts from schools with tangible reasons that make 
them fail to continue their education can be involved and form association. There is 
also lack of money used for loan and problem of coordination, auditing, etc. to 
incorporate all. The packages need more money, coordination, evaluation and 
monitoring. 
3. What are the progresses made and problems of the programs/activities? 
Are all of them successful? He said, I can categorize these activities/associations 
into three (both rural and urban): a) those which have been successful income 
generating activities (20%), b) those that dissolved/dispersed income generating 
activities (45%), c) those that became bankrupt income generating activities (35%) 
4. What are the reasons for the failure and success of some of these packages?  
The problems for the failure of some of the packages include lack of experience, 
monitoring, follow-ups, evaluation, etc. 
5. Do you think the package can accommodate all? His answer was no! no! 
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To ensure their participation in all stages of program implementation, the 
package specifies measures to be taken to empower them to be agents of change 
by providing them technical, material, financial assistance, and training 
opportunity with relevant and timely information to enhance their overall 
capacity. Measures that have to be taken to ensure their participation and to 
develop entrepreneurship mentality, attitude and the leadership capacity of the 
youth, have been  explicitly pointed out in the package; and it is designed  a) to 
develop the youth's leadership experience and promote their competence; 
leadership capacity building system would be designed and put into practice and 
engage in ventures that would enable them to produce an extensive leadership 
force; b) to ensure that the training given to the youth deployed in small-scale 
enterprise, urban farming activities and service institutions and to the youth that 
develop them includes entrepreneurship and management training and thereby 
strengthen the youths' leadership capacity and competence. What had been 
observed was more of rhetoric than practical (see box 5). 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Pressure on land is growing fast. In rural Sidama and Gedeo where problems such 
as high population pressure, increased land shortage, and the low capacity of the 
non-farm sector to siphon off the excess youth population have made access to 
land a politically, socially and economically sensitive issue. 
The youth face marginalization under both customary and formal systems of 
land tenure as a result of culturally embedded discriminatory beliefs and practices 
and adult control of resources. So, the question will be: What, then, are the 
prospects for the right-based laws which form such a central component of use 
and control over land in Ethiopia in order to translate them into realities? There 
are two crucial dimensions which need to be considered by government agencies, 
local authorities and the potential holders of these rights. One is the relationship 
between different kinds of formal institutions, at different levels (including rights-
conferring laws, but not limited to them), as well as the complex interplay 
between formal and informal institutions within which rights to use and control 
over land is asserted and resisted.  
If informal institutions are given more priority, then changes will be slow, 
patriarchal relationship over generations will perpetuate and the regulatory 
institutions stay without meaning. If regulatory institutions took dominion, then 
they can only benefit few youth and also gradually get weak as land is already 
scarce. Then the ‘struggle’ to make the youth benefit from land will be in vain. 
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But, the fit between formal and informal institutions is the key to the success of 
the farmer. 
After the introduction of Rural Youth Development Package, conflicts 
between formal institutions and communities over the use and control of land 
erupted, mostly over rights to grant ‘free land’ to the youth. Rural youth 
development package, which is expected to mitigate livelihood related problems 
of the youth including access to land needs regular monitoring and assessment of 
its effectiveness.  
It is the contention of this paper that customary and statuary institutions 
should work in harmony and should show a certain level of flexibility in order to 
reap the benefit of formal laws and the advantage of informal institutions that are 
already embedded in the society. Thus, introducing some sort of flexibility or 
modification in the formal land tenure system seems essential to avert role 
confusion between customary and statutory institutions to own, manage and use 
land by young farmers. Besides expansion and development of non-farm 
activities, encouraging and training the youth to acquire basic skills that would 
promote micro-entrepreneurship activities, etc. can also be supported by both 
formal and informal institutions. This is because continued dwelling on land, 
business as usual, may not be a sustainable option unless pressure on land is 
released.   
 Thus, we recommend what geographers call the need for ‘complementarity’ 
between two influential forces (Watts 1993, David Waugh 1995), between 
customary and statutory institutions in this case; anthropologists talk of the need 
for ‘contextual fit’ in policy development; sociologists talk about ‘embeddedness’; 
and institutional economists talk about the need for formal institutions to build 
upon informal institutions (North, 1990). This will move the debate forward and 
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